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The objective of this paper is to study optimal ￿scal and monetary policy in a dy-
namic Mirrlees model where the frictions giving rise to money as a medium of exchange
are explicitly modeled. The framework is a three period OLG model where agents are
born every other period. The young and old trade in perfectly competitive centralized
markets. In middle age, agents receive preference shocks and trade amongst them-
selves in an anonymous manner. Since preference shocks are private information, in
a record-keeping economy, the planner￿ s constrained allocation trades o⁄ e¢ cient risk
sharing against production e¢ ciency in the search market. In the absence of record-
keeping, the government uses ￿at money as a substitute for dynamic contracts to induce
truthful revelation of preferences. In￿ ation a⁄ects agents￿incentive constraints and so
distortionary taxation of money may be needed as part of the optimal policy even if
lump-sum taxes are available.
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21 Introduction
Should the in￿ ation tax be used as part of an optimal ￿scal policy? The answer to this
question has been explored in a substantial body of research using dynamic general equilib-
rium models. Most of this literature adopts the Ramsey approach to optimal taxation ￿the
government is assumed to be unable to use lump sum taxes and so it chooses distortionary
tax rates to maximize the welfare of the representative agent subject to being a competive
equilibrium. The best known use of this approach to study the in￿ ation tax is most no-
tably in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996), denoted CCK hereafter. They show that the
Friedman rule will be optimal if preferences are homothetic and weakly separable in con-
sumption and leisure regardless of whether money is valued because of money-in-the-utility,
cash-in-advance or shopping time motives.
There are two drawbacks to this approach for studying the in￿ ation tax. First, even
though non-distortionary (lump-sum) taxes achieve the ￿rst-best allocation, the represen-
tative agent approach simply prohibits their use for some unmodeled reason. Thus, the
￿rst-best is not implementable solely because of an unspeci￿ed feature of the environment
￿the inability to use non-distorting taxes. Second, when it comes to studying the in￿ ation
tax, money is always ￿ forced￿into the model via some shortcut such as money-in-the-utility
function, shopping time or cash-in-advance. The frictions that create a need for money are
never explicitly modeled. So in addition to an unspeci￿ed reason for limiting the set of
tax instruments, there is also an unmodeled friction in the environment that gives money
transaction value.
This suggests that a better approach for studying optimal ￿scal and monetary policy
is to construct an environment where: 1) the government is free to use lump-sum taxes
but chooses not to, and 2) the frictions giving rise to money as a medium of exchange are
explicitly modeled.
3Addressing point one above is the basis for the ￿ New Dynamic Public Finance￿(NDPF)
literature.1 This literature studies optimal taxation in a dynamic version of Mirrlees￿ s (1971)
model where agents are heterogeneous and there is private information about agent types.
In this framework, the government chooses taxes to maximize welfare subject to providing
appropriate incentives for agents to reveal private information regarding their preferences and
productivity. There are no restrictions whatsoever on the set of tax instruments available
to the government and the standard result in this literature is that distortionary taxation is
optimal.
Recently, da Costa and Werning (2008) use a Mirrlees approach to study in￿ ation taxation
by assuming labor productivity is heterogenous and there is private information regarding
this productivity. However, they assume a money-in-the utility framework to see if in￿ ation
taxation is Pareto improving. They ￿nd that the Friedman rule is optimal if money and work
e⁄ort are compliments and labor income is taxed in a non-decreasing manner. While this
result is informative for this class of monetary models, the model￿ s lack of micro-foundations
for money throws doubt on the robustness of their ￿ndings. How could this be the case? If
money itself is used as a means to overcome private information frictions, then ignoring this
role of money when studying the optimality of positive in￿ ation within a Mirrlees framework
may yield misleading results.
Modeling the frictions that provide the microfoundations for money demand is the basis
of the "New Monetary Economics" literature. This literature, based on the Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989,1993) monetary search framework, explicitly models the trade and information
frictions that prevent the use of trade credit between agents thus giving rise to the need
for a medium of exchange. As a result, money is ￿ essential￿in that it expands the set of
allocations that can be achieved.2
1Most notable in this area are the papers by Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tysvinski (2003) and Kocher-
lakota (2005b).
2See Kocherlakota (1998) and Wallace (2001).
4The objective of this paper is to construct a model that combines these two literatures in
order to study the dynamic taxation of money. I analyze a model where money is essential as
a medium of exchange yet informational frictions induce the government to use distortionary
taxation of money balances.3 The basic model is a three period OLG/search model developed
by Zhu (2008) but with the addition of private information about individual preference
shocks. In this framework, a new generation is born every other period. In these periods,
the young and old agents can trade amongst themselves. Young agents have an endowment
of labor but old agents do not. When ￿ middle aged￿ , agents receive idiosyncratic preference
shocks that make some of them producers and others consumers.
Since Kocherlakota (1998) showed that money is fundamentally a form of record-keeping,
I construct allocations for three environments with di⁄ering assumptions on record-keeping.
First, the allocation is derived when no durable asset or record-keeping technology exists
(autarky). Second, I consider the case with a record-keeping technology where agents send
reports about their preference shocks to a planner at the beginning of middle age and, based
on their reports, are given a sequence of consumption/production in middle and old age.
Within this environment I consider two cases: 1) when the shocks are public information and
2) when they are private information. For the latter case, the allocation must be incentive
compatible with truthful revelation of the shocks. This allocation is referred to as the
constrained optimum. In the constrained optimum the planner must create consumption
risk for the old to induce agents to produce in middle age. Thus, the planner trades o⁄
risk sharing amongst the old against productive e¢ ciency when middle aged. Similar to
the NDPF literature, the planner wants to create a wedge between the marginal utility of
consumption when young against the expected marginal utility of consumption when old to
3Kocherlakota (2005a) criticizes search theoretic models of money for studying in￿ ation taxation without
allowing for an array of other tax instruments. This paper, as well as those by Aruoba and Chugh (2008)
and Gomis-Poqueris and Peralta-Alva (2008), is an attempt to rectify that problem.
5induce truthful reporting.4
Finally, I consider decentralizing the constrained optimal allocation. I assume there is a
government with no record-keeping technology and agents do not send in reports. Rather,
as a substitute for record-keeping, the government provides ￿at currency to agents. Money
provides no utility in and of itself and only has value by being generally accepted by agents
as a medium of exchange. In this economy, middle-aged, agents search for a suitable trading
partner and bargain over the terms of trade when a match occurs. Anonymity in this
market makes money essential as a medium of exchange. Most importantly, money acts as
a device to induce truthful revelation of one￿ s type and is therefore an imperfect substitute
for a dynamic contract. In￿ ation in turn a⁄ects real balances and thus incentive constraints
of agents. The government then chooses the growth rate of the money stock, tax rates
and lump-sum transfers to achieve a maximize a social welfare function subject to being a
competive equilibrium.
Using this framework I address the following questions. First, can the constrained planner
allocation be implemented with the use of ￿at money and optimally chosen ￿scal policy?
Second, does the optimal ￿scal policy require use of the in￿ ation tax even if lump-sum taxes
are available?
Although it is di¢ cult in general to show existence or uniqueness of the constrained
optimum or the monetary equilibrium, I show that the constrained optimum can be replicated
with a non-linear consumption tax and zero lump-sum taxes. In this sense, the government
has the option to use lump-sum taxation but does not do so, instead it relies on distorting
consumption taxes. Because the government has a full set of tax instruments, it can use
the in￿ ation tax or not but the allocation is una⁄ected. I then consider the case where the
4An alternative approach would be to make money a part of the environment that gives agents an outside
option to trade, as in Aiyagari and Williamson (2000). Since money creates a better outside option for agents
and thus makes the planner￿ s problem more di¢ cult, a planner would never introduce money if it was under
his control.
6government is constrained to using lump-sum taxes and a linear consumption tax. Under this
restriction, I construct an example where both the constrained optimum and the monetary
equilibrium exists. I am then able to show that as long as the lump-sum taxes are not too
large, it is optimal for the government to resort to the in￿ ation tax as part of the optimal
policy.5
Why do I obain di⁄erent results than da Costa and Werning? Consider the following
interpretation of da Costa and Werning￿ s results. Think of e⁄ort as being negative leisure
and money as being merely a form of wealth as opposed to an argument in the utility function.
Then assuming complimentarity between money and e⁄ort is implicitly assuming leisure is
an inferior good ￿the more wealth one has, the less leisure is taken. In my framework,
agents have to work today to acquire money for future consumption. So a standard wealth
e⁄ect occurs ￿if an agent has more money today, he wants more leisure today (via lower
e⁄ort/production). Consequently, to induce optimal e⁄ort/production, money is taxed via
in￿ ation even though lump-sum taxes are available.
What is most striking about this example is that distortionary taxation of money is
optimal even though preferences are homothetic and separable in consumption and leisure.
This suggests distortionary taxation of money is driven by the informational frictions that
make money essential as a medium of exchange as opposed to assumptions on homotheticity
or separability of preferences or on the complementarity between money and work e⁄ort.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the environment is described. Then I derive
the autarkic allocation and the constrained optimal stationary allocation for a planner with
a record-keeping technology. Then the equilibrium steady state conditions are derived for
the monetary equilibrium. I then show how the constrained optimum can be replicated
and describe aspects of the optimal tax structure. Finally, I analyze an example where
5Zhu (2008) also shows that in￿ ation is welfare improving in this model. However, he does not allow for
any other tax instruments hence, his results are subject to the Kocherlakota (2005a) critique.
7the government can use lump-sum taxes and linear consumption taxes. The last section
concludes.
2 Environment
The basic environment is the three period OG/search model of Zhu (2008). There is a
continuum of agents born with unit measure every other period. In these periods, the young
and the old come together. Call this location the centralized market or CM. Young agents
are endowed with labor at the start of each CM and there is a linear production technology
available that converts one unit of labor into one unit of goods. Goods are perishable so
there is no ability to store goods across periods. The old have no labor endowment and must
receive goods from the young to consume. After meeting in the CM, the old die. In the
second period of life, middle-aged agents can trade amongst themselves. Call this location
the decentralized market or DM. The CM/DM structure follows from Lagos and Wright
(2005). Let ￿ ￿ 1 be the discount factor from the DM to the CM and ￿D ￿ 1 be the
discount factor from the CM to the DM.6
An agent￿ s preferences are assumed to be additively separable across consumption, labor
and time. Let U (C) be utility from consuming C units of goods in the CM and ￿ (h) is the
disutility of working h ￿ 0 hours when young. Assume U0; ￿U00;￿0;￿00 > 0 and U0 (0) ! +1.
Preferences in middle age are given by ￿bu(q)￿￿s  (q) where ￿bu(q) is utility from consuming
q units of goods in the DM while ￿￿s  (q) is the disutility of producing q units of goods in the
DM. Assume u0;￿u00; 
0; 
00 > 0;u0 (0) ! +1 and u(0) =   (0) =  
0 (0) = 0. The variables
￿b and ￿s are preference shocks such that with probability ￿b, ￿b = 1 and ￿s = 0, meaning an
agent can consume but cannot produce. With probability ￿s, ￿b = 0 and ￿s = 1, meaning
6Unlike the dynamic taxation literature, one cannot study a ￿nite economy with ￿at money. Thus, the
OLG framework provides analytical simplicity in that we can study something akin to a ￿nite economy with
valued ￿at currency.
8an agent can produce but not consume. Finally, with probability 1 ￿ ￿b ￿ ￿s, ￿b = ￿s = 0
meaning they do neither. Those who are idle in the DM receive zero payo⁄s in the DM.
From here on I will assume ￿b = ￿s = ￿ with ￿ ￿ 1=2: I will refer to consumers as buyers,
producers as sellers and those doing neither as idle. Note that utility from consumption and
disutility from production is allowed to di⁄er across markets.
An agent￿ s lifetime utility born at time t ￿ 1 is given by
Wy;t￿1 = U (Cy;t￿1) ￿ ￿ (ht￿1) + ￿DVt
where



















and Cy is consumption when young, qb is consumption of goods in the DM if a buyer, qs is
production if a seller and Cj
o is consumption when old if the agent￿ s trading state, j, in the
DM was a buyer (b), a seller (s) or neither (n).
3 Optimal Allocations and Record-keeping
An important result in monetary theory due to Kocherlakota (1998) is that money is a
form of record-keeping. So before looking at the monetary equilibrium, I consider economies
with various forms of record-keeping technologies in order to compare them to the allocation
that occurs in the monetary equilibrium. Consider the case where there is a complete
absence of record-keeping. The age structure and the absence of durable goods or assets
means the only allocation is autarky.7 Consequently, young agents produce and consume for
7The inability of the old to produce will eliminate the use of trade credit in the DM even if there is
record-keeping and enforcement. However, if the old could produce in the CM, then trade credit in the DM
is ruled out by anonymity. As usual, the age structure in OLG models prevents the young from extending
9themselves and have qb = qs = Cj
o = 0. Lifetime welfare in the autarkic allocation is given










+￿U (0) where the superscript a denotes the autarkic choice and
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3.1 Public information and record-keeping
Now consider the case where there is a planner with a record-keeping technology. In this
environment, agents send a report to the planner about the realization of their idiosyncratic
preference shock in the DM and record-keeping technology allows the planner to keep track
of agents￿reports. Conditional on the report, the planner gives the agent a sequence of
consumption in the DM and CM. If an agent reports himself as a buyer, he is given qb units
of output by the planner in the DM to consume and Cb
o when old. If he reports himself as
a producer, he delivers qs units of output to the planner in the DM and consumes Cs
o when
old. If he reports being idle, he neither consumes nor produces in the DM and receives Cn
o
when old. As is standard, assume the planner can commit to this sequence of consumption.
We would like to know what allocation can be supported by this record-keeping technology.
Young agents simply report their age and receive Cy units of consumption and provide h
units of labor.
Assume the economy starts in period t = ￿1 with an initial generation in middle-








t=0 and DMconsumption and production fqb;qsg ￿ fqb;2t+1;qs;2t+1g
1
t=￿1
trade credit to the old.
10to maximize a weighted average of current and future generations expected utilities:
W = ￿￿





















































o;2t + (1 ￿ 2￿)C
n
o;2t + Cy;2t 8t ￿ 0
￿qs;2t+1 ￿ ￿qb;2t+1 8t ￿ 0 (2)
where ￿
t is the weight assigned to a generation born at time 2t and the weight on the ￿rst
young generation is normalized to 1.
Suppose that the preference shocks in the DM are public information and are thus ob-
servable by the planner. If the planner can force exchange to occur ex post, then the optimal
allocation satis￿es the resource constraints and
u
0 (qb;2t+1) =  
0 (qs;2t+1) t ￿ 0
U
0 (Cy;2t) = ￿
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11where Co;2t+2 is old age consumption. Call this the unconstrained optimal allocation.8 In
this allocation, the planner chooses the e¢ cient quantity in the DM and wants to eliminate
all CM consumption risk among the old, since Cb
o;2t = Cs
o;2t = Cn
o;2t for all t.
Note that, note that if ￿D = 1 then the initial old get the same allocation as future
old. In short, the economy can start in a steady-state. Also, if the planner ￿ = ￿; then
in a steady state (or with linear disutility of labor for the young), the planner equates the
marginal utility of CM consumption across young and old at a point in time as well as across
time for an individual generation.
3.2 Private information and record-keeping
The unconstrained allocation is not feasible if the planner cannot observe agents￿preference
shocks. Why? Those who are producers in the DM get the same consumption in the next
CM as everyone else ￿hence there is no reward for producing. Consequently, those agents
would never reveal their true DM preference shock to the planner. So even being able to
force agents to produce is useless since the planner cannot identify who the sellers are in
the DM. As a result, with private information, the planner is constrained to implement an
allocation that is incentive compatible, i.e., agents truthfully reveal their idiosyncratic shock
in the DM and trade voluntarily. This problem is considered next.
With private information the planner has to worry about incentive constraints such that
no agent has an incentive to misrepresent their true state in the DM. Truthful reporting
8The planner can also support this allocation without resorting to force if:  (q￿) < U (Co) ￿ U (0) and
Wa < U (Cy) ￿ ￿ (Cy + Co) + ￿￿ [u(q￿) ￿   (q￿)] + ￿
2U (Co). where C￿ solves U0 (C￿) = ￿0 (C￿). The ￿rst
condition ensures that a middle aged seller prefers to produce than starve when old, while the second ensures









































The ￿rst two constraints require that buyers and sellers in the DM have no incentive to
misreport themselves as idle. The last constraint states that an idle agent must have no
incentive to misreport himself as a buyer. Buyers and idle agents cannot misrepresent them-
selves as sellers since they would be required to deliver qs > 0 units of goods, which they
cannot do. Thus, incentive constraints for these cases can be dispensed with. However, an
idle agent can declare himself a consumer and freely dispose of the goods (or consume them
at zero utility). The third constraint also ensures that a seller would rather report himself
as idle than as a buyer.
In general, there also must be a participation constraint on the young to induce them
to produce output for both generations rather than go into autarky and produce only for
themselves. Suppose a young agent decides not to participate. The worst punishment the








+ ￿￿ [u(￿ qb;2t+1) ￿ c(￿ qs;2t+1)] + ￿D￿EU
￿ ￿ Co;2t+2
￿
The bars denote the planner￿ s allocation. If the constraint does bind then obviously, the
planner would prefer autarky as well since his objective is to maximize the lifetime utility of
the agents. I will proceed as if this constraint is not binding. Given the resulting allocation,
one would then need to impose restrictions on preferences to ensure the constrained optimal
allocation makes this constraint non-binding. For example, if U (C) = lnC then U (0) ! ￿1
13so this will typically be satis￿ed.
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The optimal allocation under private information satis￿es

























+ (1 ￿ ￿)U0 ￿
Cs
o;2t+2
￿ ￿ 1 t ￿ ￿1
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From these conditions we see three key results. First, sellers￿incentive constraints bind
so they get no trade surplus in the DM. It then follows that, for any q;2t+1 > 0, DM sellers
14have to receive more old age consumption than idle agents to compensate them for producing
in the DM. Second, the idle DM agents￿incentive constraints bind, meaning they get the
same old age consumption as DM buyers. As a result, there is incomplete risk-sharing in
old age consumption all for t ￿ 0. Finally, because the planner must accept incomplete
risk-sharing among the old to induce DM sellers to produce, DM output is ine¢ ciently low.
Thus, due to incentive constraints, the planner trades o⁄e¢ ciency in DM production against
old age risk-sharing. Note that if ￿D = 1 then the allocation between the initial old and the
initial young is equivalent to that arising in later generations. i.e., the planner can start the
economy o⁄ in a steady state.







































From this expression, we see that the planner wants to equate the marginal utility of young
consumption to the harmonic mean of old age marginal utility of consumption. This is in
constrast to (3) where the planner equates the marginal utility of young consumption to the
arithmetic mean of marginal utility when old.
Call a solution to these equations the constrained optimal allocation. Set ￿D = 1 and
consider a steady-state allocation for the constrained optimum. A steady-state constrained































(1 ￿ ￿)U0 (Cs
o) + ￿U0 (Cb
o)
> 1 (8)
  (q) = ￿ [U (C
s





















Note that if ￿ = 0 the information problem is e⁄ectively eliminated (the only state is idle
and publicly known) and the unconstrained allocation (Co;Cy) can be implemented subject
to the young agents￿participation constraint being satis￿ed (q is irrelevant in this case).
4 Monetary equilibrium: Absence of recordkeeping
Now consider the case where the government has no record-keeping technology and receives
no reports. Instead it provides ￿at currency to agents. Money is the only durable object in
the economy and it is perfectly divisible and agents can hold unbounded amounts. Money
is injected in lump sum fashion to the middle-aged agents. As will be shown, since they all
leave the CM with the same amount of money the lump-sum injection has equal value to all
young agents.9 Since monetary injections occur every other period we have Mt+2 = ￿tMt
where ￿t = 1 + ￿t is the gross growth rate of the money supply from t to t + 2. From here
on, the t subscript is suppressed for notational ease so that +1 denotes t + 2 and so on.
In the CM, ￿rms hire labor and sell the output in perfectly competitive markets. Given
9This eliminates welfare gains from in￿ ation due to a non-degenerate distribution of money balances as
in Levine (1991), Molico (2006) and Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2005).
16the linear production technology the real wage paid to young labor is 1. Firms sell their
output at the nominal price P = 1=￿ where ￿ is the goods price of money in the CM. It then
follows that the gross real rate of return on money from t ￿ 1 to t + 1. is Rm = ￿+1=￿￿1:
In the DM, the preference shocks create a double coincidence of wants problem, which
combined with anonymity means that money is essential for trade ￿buyers give up money
for goods while sellers increase their holdings of money by selling goods. As a result, there is
a non-degenerate distribution of money balances among the old. However, death keeps the
distribution of money holdings analytically tractable. This DM/CM structure gives money a
￿ store of value￿role from young to old age and a ￿ medium of exchange￿function in middle age.
How buyers and sellers are matched in the DM is left unspeci￿ed but it could be modeled as
the result of random search or a random matching process that pairs each buyer to a seller
who then bargain over the terms of trade.
The role of money in the decentralized economy is that it induces truthful revelation of
one￿ s type. A seller is willing to reveal his type if the buyer can o⁄er money for goods. By
revealing his true type and producing today, a seller acquires money which generates more
future consumption. Furthermore, idle agents will not attempt to mimic buyers since doing
so means giving up money today (future consumption) for goods they do not desire today.
Hence, money is a replacement for the dynamic contract (i.e., record-keeping) used by the
planner. The only remaining question is whether the introduction of money and taxations
can replicate the constrained optimum.10
The government is able to observe an agent￿ s age, hours worked by the young, and
consumption. It can impose lump sum taxes/transfers by age, distortionary labor taxes on
the young and a non-linear consumption tax on market goods purchased. The consumption
10In this paper, the role of money in overcoming private information frictions is explicitly taken into
account. This view of money is quite di⁄erent than in da Costa and Werning (2008), who use a money-in-
the-utility function model of money. They do not ask what information frictions are being overcome via the
use of money. Since information frictions are at the heart of the Mirrlees approach to taxation, it seems that
being explicit about all information frictions is preferred when studying the in￿ ation tax.
17tax can be made age dependent.11 The consumption tax on the old is collected in the form
of consumption goods as opposed to payment in cash. Since all market consumption of the
old is bought with cash the consumption tax is equivalent to a tax on real monetary wealth.
The government￿ s budget constraint is
To = ￿
















where Ty is a lump-sum tax of goods on the young, To is the lump-sum transfer to the old,
￿h is the tax rate on real labor income, and ￿c is the consumption tax rate on young agents￿
consumption. Furthermore, ￿ (Cj
o ￿ To) is the market consumption tax collected from an old
agent who acquired Cj
o ￿ To units of goods in the CM.12
In the monetary equilibrium, at the start of the DM, the lifetime expected utility of a
middle-aged agent depends on the amount of money brought into the DM. Let qb (m;ms)
and Cb
o;+1 (m;ms) be the quantities an individual j consumes when he is a buyer with m
units of money and meets a seller with money balances ms in the DM and the next CM









denote the quantities individual j
produces and consumes when he holds m units of money and meets a buyer with mb units
of money in the DM and next CM respectively. We thus have, Vt = Vt(m) where










































11The use of age-dependent distortionary taxes has been studied in an OG framework by Erosa and
Gervais (2002).
12Old agents total consumption is Cj
o = CCM
o + To where CCM
o is the consumption of goods acquired

























18In what follows, I will solve the problem facing a representative agent of a generation born
in time t ￿ 1.
4.1 CM Trading
An agent born at time t ￿ 1 chooses Cy;￿1;h￿1 and m to
max
Cy;￿1;h￿1;m
U (Cy;￿1) ￿ ￿ (h￿1) + Vt (m)
s:t: (1 + ￿













0 (Cy;￿1) = V
0 (m) (14)
Since the FOC are the same for all young agents they leave with the same amount of money
balances. Note that since consumption and money balances are ￿nanced by labor, the labor
tax rate does not directly appear in (14). Old agents use their real balances to pay for their












































￿ j = b;s;o:
194.2 DM Trading
In the second period agents receive their idiosyncratic preference shocks and trade.
4.2.1 Bargaining
Suppose that after receiving their lump-sum transfer of cash and realizing their idiosyncratic
shocks, each buyer is paired with a seller via some process and they bargain over the terms
of trade. The terms of trade is a pair (q;d) where q is the quantity of goods exchanged while
d is the quantity of money exchanged. It is assumed agent￿ s money balances are observable













s:t: d ￿ m
b














o;+1 is the old age consumption if the seller walks away. If U0 (To) is su¢ ciently large,







































20If the cash constraint does bind q and d solve
d = m
b

















o;+1. With buyer-take-all bargaining (12) becomes
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If the cash constraint does bind then, in a symmetric equilibrium, we have
V
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21Combining (16) with (13) and (14) gives
1
1 + ￿cU
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which using (15) can also be written as
1
1 + ￿cU

























If the constraint binds then using (17) with (13) and (14) gives
1
1 + ￿cU

























Equation (18) looks like a standard consumption Euler equation. However, note that this is
not a standard Euler equation because the term in brackets on the right-hand-side of this





missing due to the buyer-take-all assumption. So, when choosing money balances, young
agents ignore any old age consumption value from a marginal unit of money should they be
a seller in the DM. Since a buyer does not spend all of his money balances, DM consumption
does not appear even though money is essential for trade in this market. In short, the
marginal liquidity value of money in the DM is zero. Note that the Euler equations are the
same for both the unconstrained and constrained case. Thus, the only di⁄erence is in the
equilibrium values of the arguments.
Consider a symmetric steady-state with mb = ms = mo = M+1 and ￿+1M+1 = ￿￿1M￿1 =
z, e.g., real balances in the CM are constant across time, and ￿+1=￿￿1 = 1=￿ = Rm where
Rm is the gross rate of return on money. Furthermore, real spending (measured in the next
CM goods price) in the DM is stationary, ￿+1d = ￿.
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where (23) is the CM aggregate resource constraint and comes from substituting the gov-
ernment￿ s budget constraint into the young￿ s CM budget constraint. Using (20)-(23), the
last four equations give us q;z;￿ and Cy as functions of Rm = 1=￿. With a binding cash
constraint, (26) is replaced by z = ￿ and (27) is replaced by (19).
Finally, note that if ￿ = 0 it is straightforward to show that the unconstrained optimum
can be achieved (q is then irrelevant) by setting ￿0 (￿) = ￿h = To = 0 and Rm = 1=￿ in
the monetary economy. However, it is also the case that the unconstrained optimum can
be replicated by removing money from the economy and using lump-sum taxes. In short,
money is not essential if the government has access to lump-sum taxes and transfers. Thus,
the OLG structure is not what makes money essential in this model. Rather it is the search
market with private information on preferences that is critical for the results we obtain below
regarding the optimal ￿scal policy. The OLG structure itself merely keeps the distribution
of money balances tractable.
236 Replicating the constrained optimum
In general, it is di¢ cult to show existence or uniqueness of the constrained optimal alloca-
tion and the equilibrium allocation. However, examples can be constructed which in which
unique solutions exist. Nevertheless, under the assumption that a constrained optimal allo-
cation exists, we can ask whether or not it can be replicated (decentralized) in the monetary
economy via an appropriately designed system of taxes.
6.1 Non-linear consumption taxes
Consider the equilibrium allocation where the cash constraint does not bind. Under Inada
conditions on CM utility, this can always be achieved by setting To su¢ ciently low (or even
zero). For ease of notation, let ￿ (Cj
o ￿ To) = ￿jCj
o and ￿ (Cj
o ￿ To) = ￿j. Although I have
modeled this as a consumption tax it is equivalent to a non-linear tax on the old agents￿
monetary wealth.
Comparing (5)-(10) to (21)-(27) we see that replicating the constrained optimal allocation
requires
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￿ (31)
The ￿rst line ensures that the young agents consumption/work decision is not distorted
and is an application of the uniform commodity taxation principle. The second is needed
for ￿ Cb
o = ￿ Cn
o , i.e., partial risk-sharing. The third ensures that the quantities in the DM are
24constrained optimal. Finally, the last one ensures the optimal amount of risk-sharing occurs.
Since there are 6 quantities to replicate and 8 tax instruments available, there are numerous
ways of replicating the constrained optimal allocation. But under all possible tax policies
we have the following relationship: ￿o > ￿b > ￿s which means there is some progressivity
in the tax system and some regressivity. Thus, a linear consumption (or wealth) tax cannot
replicate the constrained optimal allocation. Interestingly, the ￿ rich￿old agents (those who
sold in the DM) face the lowest tax rate. This is needed to induce them to produce in the
DM and to produce the optimal amount.
With a full set of non-linear tax rates, the real return on money Rm can be greater than
one, one or less than one. Thus, the government may or may not use the in￿ ation tax.
However, it cannot be too small for the following reason. A young agent could work more
and take in z + ￿ units of money into the DM, then choose not to work if he is a seller and
have z + ￿ or z when old. This incentive to deviate can be avoided by raising the real value
of money and thus ￿: This in turn makes it more costly for the young agent to acquire the
additional ￿ units of real balances. Consequently, Rm cannot be too low.
However, note that if ￿c = 0, then we can interpret ￿o;￿b and ￿c as tax rates on money
balances(or wealth) when old. In this case, the LHS of (31) measures the after-tax real
return on money. It then follows that the optimal policy reduces the after-tax rate of return
on money, the LHS of (31), below what would be optimal in the standard two-period OG
model, which is Rm = 1=￿. In short, the optimal policy is to reduce the after tax return on
money to reduce consumption risk when old.
Note that if ￿ = 0; then ￿ = 0 and ￿o = ￿b = ￿c = ￿h = 0; Rm = 1=￿ replicates the
constrained optimum. However, money is not essential in this case if lump-sum transfers are
available since with ￿ = 0 the information/trade frictions disappear and To = ￿ Co is optimal.
256.2 Linear tax rates and lump-sum taxes
With linear consumption taxes, the constrained optimum cannot be replicated even if lump-
sum taxes are available. If we constrain the government to using linear tax rates and lump
sum taxes, will it be optimal to use the in￿ ation tax? In general it is di¢ cult to show
however. In what follows I construct an example where the constrained optimum exists and
is unique. Furthermore, the equilibrium with unconstrained cash holdings also exists and
is unique if To is su¢ ciently low. I then consider a Ramsey problem where the government
chooses, consumption tax rates and labor tax rates and lump sum taxes.
Let preferences in the CM be homothetic and given by U (C) = lnC, ￿ (h) = h, u(q) =
1 ￿ exp￿q and   (q) = ￿q with ￿ < ￿ < 1. It follows that C￿
y = 1 in all examples and
q￿ = ln(1=￿) > 0. Since U (0) = ln0 ! ￿1, the young￿ s participation constraint will not
be binding.





















￿ Cy = 1 ￿ h = 1 + ￿
where a unique value 0 < ￿ q < q￿ solves
￿￿￿ q + ￿ ln[￿exp
￿ q ￿￿] = ￿ ln(1 ￿ ￿):
Example of the non-binding cash constraint Assume that ￿j = ￿c so that all agents
pay the same linear consumption tax and U0 (To) is su¢ ciently large that agents do not spend
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and is independent of Rm; ￿h; ￿c and for To su¢ ciently small to ensure the cash constraint
is not binding. Surprising since ^ " is independent of Rm the quantity traded in the DM is
independent of any of the tax instruments. This is due to the homothetic nature of CM
preferences ￿although ^ Cs
o and ^ Cb
o are decreasing functions of Rm the ratios of the two are
not. Hence from (26) if ^ " is independent of Rm then q is as well.
Optimal ￿scal policy What is the optimal ￿scal policy in this economy? Assume the
government chooses taxes to maximize steady-state welfare subject to these equilibrium
outcomes. Under the condition that To is small enough such that the cash constraint does
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This implies that there is more in￿ ation in this model than is optimal in the standard two-
period OG model. Note that if we set ￿ = 0, which e⁄ectively shuts down the DM, then
Rm = 1=￿ which is that standard result. If ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1 so the government maximizes
the SS welfare of the representative generation, then Rm = 1 and ￿ = 1 is optimal.
So why is in￿ ation preferred when ￿ > 0? In their choice of real balances, young agents
take into account the marginal value of buying additional goods. However, in equilibrium,
this additional unit of money also raises the amount of real wealth they have if they are
a seller in a match. This wealth e⁄ect means the quantity produced will be lower, ceteris
paribus. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium they overestimate the quantity of goods they
receive from this marginal unit of money. As a result, money is overvalued and young agents
must work too much to acquire a unit of real balances. Thus, in￿ ation reduces the wealth
28of agents and induces sellers to produce more on the margin for a unit of money.
Finally, if ￿c = ￿h = 0 then To = ￿Ty but these transfers have no e⁄ect on the allocation
when they are su¢ ciently small since ^ " is constant. Why? If To > 0; young agents know they
will be getting a transfer of goods when old. This lowers the marginal value of carrying a unit
of money into old age and therefore decreases the demand for money when young. It follows
that the goods price of money in the CM, ￿, decreases thereby reducing the equilibrium
value of real balances by exactly the value of the transfer. Consequently, consumption when
old is una⁄ected by the transfer. More succinctly, real balances and transfers are perfect
subsitutes. While the current young have to work more to provide the transfer to the current
old, they work less to earn the needed real balances. On net, labor hours are unchanged. So
setting To = Ty = 0 is consistent with maximizing SS welfare.
7 Conclusion
We observe distortionary taxation of wealth by governments to redistribute wealth and to
achieve a more equitable distribution of consumption across agents. Since standard Ramsey
analyses suggest lump-sum taxation achieves the ￿rst best allocation, the use of distorting
taxes is puzzling. Research in the NDPF literature has provided important insights as to
why governments may use distortionary taxation of wealth, via capital income taxes, even
though lump sum taxes are available. This paper has shown that since money is always a
form of wealth, even when used for transaction purposes, it is not exempt from the same
arguments.
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